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RESTRICTED 
CAPABILITIES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, INCLUDING 
NAVAL THINKING ON ITS EMPLOYMENT 
Extracts from a Lecture by 
Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons, U.S.N. 
at the Naval War College 
February 16, 1950 
My lecture is supposed to be about naval thinking on the em­
ployment of the atomic bomb. I find difficulty in separating naval 
thinking from military thinking and national thinking in this case. 
I don't think that you can draw any sharp or beneficial distinction 
between them. They necessarily interact on each other and are 
included under this heading of national thinking. 
It is necessary even to go into what we mean by thinking 
itself. I have been impressed by the type of thinking which has 
gone on since 1945. I've followed it rather carefully, and I have 
been affected by it. I think the term "visceral thinking" applies 
to quite a lot that has been done since 1945. There are inarticu­
late visceral thinkers, who take a set of facts and draw some most 
remarkable conclusions from them. The inarticulate visceral 
thinkers are of the type who do not pay much attention to news­
papers and radio programs. They are almost impervious to what 
we call propaganda. They are also inarticulate because they don't 
read much and certainly wouldn't think of writing very much. 
Those people take a set of bare facts such as these : "We had to 
land in Normandy; we had done a lot of bombing; in spite of that 
we had to march through on the ground. But when we dropped 
two atomic bombs on Japan they surrendered." That's all they think 
Admiral Parsons is presently on duty with the Weapons System 
Evaluation Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has been 
associated with the atomic bomb project since 1943 and was bomb 
commander at the Hiroshima bombing. 
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of, and then don't analyze it at all. That, I think, is behind a great 
deal of the terrific worry and pressure which has prodded and 
harassed the Atomic Energy Commission and has maintained the 
atomic energy program. That is plain reflex-deduction from a set 
of facts without any critical appraisal of those facts, what went be­
hind them, or anything else. Their conclusions are drawn: "A sur­
render of Japan occurred after two atomic bombs were dropped. A 
surrender did not occur in Europe because atomic bombs were not 
used." 
The articulate thinkers, including some atomic· scientists for 
the first several years during the pre-Blackett era of articulate 
thinkers, created the concept of the "absolute weapon." They 
were using "visceral thinking" but they were rationalizing and 
dressing it up in very impressive language. That concept of the 
"absolute weapon" was still obtaining in full force when I spoke here 
in September, 1948. I found it necessary to go into it, to go into its 
expression, its impact on concepts which were being reported as 
war plans, and I had to work it over rather thoroughly. Then within 
three weeks, Dr. Blackett's book came out. The British edition 
that came out first, was called "Military and Political Consequences 
of Atomic Energy." The American edition was titled "Fear, 
War and the Bomb." The book is a most remarkable analysis. I 
would say it is by far the best presentation. in English, of the 
Russian point of yiew. It really sharpened the issues in this case 
and it was a terrific shock to many of our highest-powered scientists 
who had been associated with radar, atomic-energy development, 
proximity fuse development, and had seen their work bear fruit in 
important military consequences during the war. Dr. Blackett had 
received the American Medal for Merit for his very fine work in 
anti-submarine operations analysis during the war. He was -given 
similar decorations in England, I believe. As his book was pub-
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lished he also received the Nobel Prize for his work, beginning in 
the early twenties, in nuclear physics. Doctor Blackett had been an 
officer in the Royal Navy during World War I. He had then gone 
into physics. He had about the best mental equipment for opera­
tions analysis and scientific military appraisal of any scientist of his 
time. That was quite a shock, as I say, to our scientists who had 
thought that their analyses of military consequences and military 
tactics should be absolutely sound because they had used scientific 
methods in producing them. This was a demonstration, by one of 
the best equipped, best thinkers among physicists and scientists in 
general, that you could take a set of facts, that you could handle 
them in apparently scientific fashion and you could prove practically 
anything that your apparent religion and philosophy demanded to 
be proved, and do it, not in Russia, but right in England, using the 
accepted terminologies and accepted operations research methods. 
It was a terrible blow to our Operations Analysts and other 
scientists in the United States to have one of their most eminent 
members write this book. That was independent of the impact of 
the book itself. I have just given the impact on the scientists. 
The book probably had a beneficial effect in many ways, because 
it sharpened the issues and caused people to re-examine the facts 
to see how Blackett could be combatted. That was the beginning 
of a new era in the articulate arguments on atomic energy and 
its military consequences. 
That illustrates to me a very necessary thing in working over 
facts, particularly intelligence observations and in thinking of what 
Russia, for instance, can do under certain conditions. To go back 
to Ptolemy and Copernicus, you can say that imagining the sun and 
the stars as revolving around the earth because it "looked that 
way" was an example of "visceral thinking" which was dignified 
by some of the best so-called scientists for hundreds of years. The 
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accurate, correct interpretation had to be fought over for just that 
length of time before people would actually look at this set of 
facts and derive the correct conclusion from them. 
I will now mention another recent shock. We operated un­
der a semi-dictatorship in World War Two. We had absolute 
priority of effort, and we got results like the Manhattan District, 
production of aircraft and production of fleets. We then demob­
ilized and concentrated on automobiles, television and like things. 
But we forgot that Russia had not demobilized and was still op­
erating under a dictatorship more rigid and perhaps as dynamic as 
the one that we had operated under in World War Two. We did not 
take account of certain little red flags that were flying. I'm lead­
ing up to this shock that we experienced when the announcement 
came out on the 23rd of September about a Russian atomic ex­
plosion. We were quite shocked. But if we had thought of Cf'l'­
tain things which had occurred, such as the obvious flying around 
of wing jet fighters and many copies of our B-29, when we knew 
how hard it had been for us to put anything like that number into 
the air, we would have been less shocked. Those red flags indi­
cated that regardless of how inefficiently rail transportation and 
various other routine operations were carried out in Russia, when 
they assigned top priority to a job, it really rolled. That made it 
not too much of a shock to some of us who had been observing 
those red flags flying. But indicates the kind of trap into which 
we can fall when we sit in one type of organization, one type of 
climate, one type of pressure and try to estimate what someone 
else is going to do, living under a completely different system with 
uiff erent motivations. 
That leads me into one or two final points. I was very 
much impressed with the talk General Marshall gave this week 
at the National War College. I'll mention just one of his points. 
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He was commenting on the old Army War College, but I think his 
remarks applied to war colleges in general. He said that it is very 
necessary to be as concrete as possible in plans and to get away as 
far as we can from purely abstract statements. He warned that 
the difficulties we had had with Army War College Command and 
Staff schools and staff people, were their tendency to deal in the 
abstract rather than the concrete. He gave an illustration occurring 
at an early peak of activity, say in 1939, '40 and '41, when he, as 
Chief of Staff, and as Deputy Chief of Staff before that, was fac: 
ing concrete problems not very far away from the Army War 
College. They were taking it very easy with their two-week man­
euver, or whatever it was called. He said that he would like to ex­
pose them to some of the real facts of life, and the way it would oc­
cur would be this: They would be given two-thirds of the neces­
sary information for working out a problem on Saturday noon; 
they would work over the week-end at highest pressure on those two­
thirds of the problem; on Monday, they would be given the missing 
third which showed that they would have to throw all their work 
over the week-end into the waste-basket; on Tuesday the rules 
would be changed, and on Thursday the whole solution would be 
thrown out. 
Citing the need for realism and concreteness does not imply 
ability to predict events. Dr. Isaiah Bowman, retiring president of 
Johns Hopkins made a pertinent comment when we asked him how 
he had made such very good predictions of events to come. In the 
last fifteen years, he has been credited with having hit the nail on 
the head with many of them. In denying this ability he said, "I 
don't think that it is possible for anyone to predict in detail what 
will happen. The actual event depends too much on pure accident 
and the personalities of people involved." 
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lessons of history, and get some reassurance from them with res­
pect to the probability of the human getting permanently or too 
tragically out of control. 
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